There are many settings in which voting takes place serially across a set of issues. Congressmen vote on bills and amendments to bills one at a time. Supreme Court justices vote on cases one at a time. Members of regulatory bodies such as the Federal Election Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission vote on issues brought before them one at a time. In each case, matters are decided serially by some form of majority rule.
It is often true that what a voter most desires on one issue depends on decisions on other issues.
This dependence has been recognized at least since Black and Newing (1951) and more recently by Shepsle (1979) circumstances. As we will point out, it may be very difficult in political settings for voters to establish the linkage between present alternatives and future decisions. This is particularly true when the same issues are not decided repeatedly over time or important changes occur in the voting environment after current voting has taken place. This difficulty forces each voter to make simplifying assumptions about how each alternative presently being voted on is linked to a decision on each future issue of concern to the voter. We will show that a reasonable method exists whereby voters can condition present votes on expectations regarding future decisions, even when uncertainty exists concerning how present alternatives and future decisions are related. This method induces symmetric, single-peaked preferences for each voter on each issue. Thus, an equilibrium decision exists on each issue. In the following section, we will discuss the difficulty of linking present alternatives to future decisions in a politically charged environment. This discussion will motivate the model to be developed in subsequent sections of the paper.
Relating Present to Future Decisions
It may appear that a sufficient condition for predicting future decisions on the basis of present alternatives is complete knowledge of all voters' preferences. Denzau and Mackay (1981) In the next section, we will develop an alternative approach that is explicitly informed by political realities. We will assume that the voter uses a probability density function to characterize his beliefs about what the final decision on each future issue will be. The mean and variance of this density function will be assumed to be independent of the alternatives of the issue presently being voted on. Otherwise, an unspecified dependence may exist between present alternatives and future decisions. Future and past decisions may also be linked in the voter's mind. In other words, we assume some independence between present alternatives and future decisions, but we do so because voter uncertainty about the future precludes further knowledge of what this dependence is.
The Model
We exposit our results for the case of three issues voted on one at a time, although our results are fully general and are proved for any finite number of issues in the Appendix. We assume that the alternatives to be voted on are legislative appropriations merely to facilitate the exposition Consider a set of voters N 1 , n } that must decide the level of spending on each of a set of issues I = { 1,2,31. Issue 1 might be spending on the B-I bomber, issue 2 spending on the stealth bomber, and issue 3 spending on the MX missile. Such issues can be voted separately, for example, as amendments to a defense authorization bill. Or, the three issues might be three amendments to a given budget resolution, each seeking to restore funds that have been cut from various programs. Another possibility is three authorization bills reported by three different committees and voted on at differing points in time. It is not necessary for a voter actually to vote on all the issues; all that is required is that his or her preferences be defined over alternative decisions taken over all three issues. The issues also may not be voted on consecutively. It is even possible for preferences to change after one issue has been decided and before the next issue is considered. This last possibility is particularly important to keep in mind from the standpoint of the assumptions we will make about voter forecasting. Changing preferences certainly make forecasting more difficult, particularly if the nature of such changes is hard to predict.
Each issue is decided by majority rule and is voted on separately in numerical order. The issues may not be voted on in unbroken order. However, if intervening issues exist, we assume that voter preferences are independent of these issues. We assume also that a status quo spending level exists on each issue, which is the amount appropriated for the current fiscal year. Any spending level can be proposed as the amount for the upcoming fiscal year and is accepted in place of the status quo if a majority of voters-(n + 1)/2 for n odd or (n / 2) + 1 for n even-prefers the new proposal to the status quo. A finite set of proposals is voted on, each vote being taken between two proposals in this set. The agenda by which voting takes place is not predetermined. Once all proposals in the set are voted on, the issue is finally decided. The last accepted proposal on the prior issue is the final decision on that issue. Voting on succeeding issues takes place in similar fashion. Once a final decision is reached on an issue, it is not voted on again.
Each voter i has preferences defined over the space of possible outcomes, where an outcome is a triple, consisting of an appropriation for issues 1, 2, and 3. In keeping with classical spatial theory ( Returning to the case of three issues, suppose i must vote on issue 1 without knowing how issues 2 and 3 will be decided. Assuming that ai12, ai13, and ai23 are not all zero, i must make some type of forecast concerning how issues 2 and 3 will be decided if he is to know what he most prefers on issue 1.
As we have argued, this is a very difficult problem in most political settings. Accordingly, suppose the voter's forecasts of the final decisions on issues 2 and 3 are a pair of random variables 02 and 03. These forecasts may be idiosyncratic. 02 is a random variable representing the range of final decisions on issue 2 that i believes possible as well as the probability density associated with each. 02 may be discrete or continuous and has mean /2 and In the face of this fundamental uncertainty about future decisions, a reasonable approach for voter i is to adopt some type of independence condition as a working hypothesis. The condition we will invoke is that 'u2, ,l3, 2, and a2 are independent of alternative spending levels on issue 1. To put it more fully, since voter i does not know how alternative spending levels on issue 1 condition decisions on later issues (or even all the factors that eventually will influence these decisions), he invokes the minimal assumption that the means and variances of his forecasts on later issues are independent of the spending level set on issue 1. He is not myopic in the sense of expecting Since the second derivative (2a 1 1) is positive (Ai is positive definite and, thus, ail 1 > 0), the right-hand side of equation (7) Again, pNi and Ai must be fixed while issue 3 is under consideration, but they may be different from their values when earlier issues were voted on. In either case, symmetric, single-peaked preferences are also induced on issue 3, conditioned on med 01 and med 0 . Assuming med 03 is the unique median of this set of conditioned ideal points and is one of the proposals that is voted on, (med 0 , med 0 , med 0) will be the equilibrium outcome and final set of decisions for all three issues. It is important to point out that coalition formation does not upset this equilibrium so long as each voter votes according to his induced preferences on each issue. In other words, we have identified a strong equilibrium.
An Example
A simple example illustrates the above results and will aid in clarifying some additional points.
Assume five voters labelled A, B, C, D, and E with preferences defined over three issues. Each issue can be seen as the level of spending for a given program. Table 1 lists the ideal spending package for each voter on these three issues, the current appropriation for each, and the budgetary request from the executive branch.
We will assume that the preferences of voters A, -C, and D are based on simple Euclidean distance. Thus Aa = Ac = Ad = I, the 3 x 3 identity matrix, and preferences are separable across issues. However, for voter B we will set abl I = ab22 = ab33 = 1, but abl2 = -.9, ab13 = -.4, and ab23 = -.6. Thus, the more that is spent on each issue, the more B wishes to see spent on remaining issues. For voter E, we will set ael I = ae22 = ae33 = 1 and ael2 = .9, ae13 = .6, ae23 = .5. Thus, the less that is spent on each issue, the more E would like to see spent on remaining issues.
Since A, C, and D have separable preferences, forecasts are unnecessary for them to decide how Let us assume that B and E are not even sure of the ideal points of the other voters. However, they do know the current appropriation zj and the budgetary request zy on each issue j = 1, 2, 3. Given our earlier assumption that each forecast variable takes its values in the interval between zj and Z4l, what is a reasonable mean forecast on issues 2 and 3? This is not a simple question, and we do not wish to suggest any final answers. However, the voter's task is greatly simpified if we focus on a small set of proposals. Let {$30, $50, $80, $100} be the set of proposals that will be voted on in the form of substitute amendments for each of the three issues. Then, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the forecasting difficulties we have described earlier leave the voters with the conclusion that each of these proposals is equally likely to be the final decision. If this is so, $65 is the mean forecast on each issue. Given these mean forecasts, the conditional ideal point of B on issue 1 (in millions of dollars) is 100 + .9(65-50) + .4(65-20) = 131.5, and the conditional ideal point of E on issue 1 (in millions of dollars) is 60 -.9(65-60) -.6(65-60) = 52.5. The revised set of ideal points on issue 1 is, then, {$120, $131.5, $30, $15, $52.5), and the median of this set is $52.5. Since $50 is the proposal closest to $52.5, $50 will be the final decision on issue 1.
Using this information in order to vote on issue 2, B's conditional ideal point on the second issue is 50 + .9(50-100) + .6(65-20) = 32, and E's conditional ideal point on issue 2 is 60 .9(50-60) -.5(65-60) -66.5, so that the revised set of ideal points on issue 2 is {$100, $32, $30, $200, $66.5), with $66.5 the median on the second issue. Since $80 is the proposal closest to $66.5, $80 will be the final decision on issue 2. Notice that $80 is the actual decision reached on issue 2, whereas $65 is the mean forecast. What are B and E to make of this discrepancy? Remember that $65 is not the actual forecast on issue 2, but is, instead, the mean of the forecast. If it were voted on, $65 would win against any of the other four alternatives. What is most important here is that it is impossible to learn very much from the way the votes are cast about how present alternatives condition future decisions. In fact, although we do not assume it for this example, voters may anticipate that preferences will-change in some unknown way with respect to some future issue between the time the present issue is voted on and the time the future issue is taken up. Thus, if a fourth issue were being voted on, it is hard to imagine how B or E might alter their forecasts on issue 4 based on the discrepancy between their mean forecast on issue 2 and the final decision.
Continuing 
Weakening the Independence Condition
The question we wish to consider in this section is how far can we weaken the condition we have imposed that the mean and variance of each forecast are independent of alternative spending levels on other issues and yet still obtain our stability results?
Assume when voting on issue 1, for example, that the means but not the variances of 62 and 03 are seen as depending on 01 and i1. Then, we can write the two conditional means 12 1 01 and g2 1x1 for 02 and the two conditional means /31 01 and A31 1 for 03. How does this dependence affect the results previously derived?
Interestingly, repeating the steps used to derive expression (6) from expression (3), the only change in the later expression is that 12 01 and /3101 occur on the left-hand side of expression (6) in place of /12 and .3 and 821 and g3 j1 occur on the right-hand side of expression (6) in place of /12 and /13. Otherwise, expression (6) is unchanged. This is also true for expressions (8) and (9) and holds true in the general case. As we will point out shortly, however, there is an important change in the meaning of these expressions.
Why have we sacrificed this additional generality for our results by assuming a lack of dependence between mean forecasts and alternatives on other issues? We have done so because we assume imperfect information about future decisions. For voters to condition 12 and /13 on alternative spending levels on issue 1 (or for them to condition /13 on alternative spending levels on issues 1 and 2) is to presume that they know the form of this conditioning. Since we have explained the difficulties in connecting present with future decisions (even in the unlikely case that all voter preferences are known), it is self-contradictory to build this assumption into the model. Thus, the independence of the g's (or u's) from alternatives on other issues is based on the idea that voters do not possess sufficient information to operate on any other basis.
It should also be mentioned that there are two ways of weakening the independence condition. The first way is to allow the mean or variance of each forecast to depend on alternatives presently being voted on. The second way is to allow the mean or variance of each forecast to depend on factors other than the alternatives of the present issue, such as decisions on past issues. The first type of dependence destroys the general existence of equilibrium, whereas the second does not. Referring to expression (8), for example, it is clear that if /3 differs, depending on 02 or 42, the last term on both sides of the inequality will no longer be identical. Thus, there can be two conditional ideal points on issue 2, one based on 02 and one based on 0'2. Preferences on issue 2 will then be multipeaked and so, in general, equilibrium will not exist. The same reasoning applies if o2 is conditioned on alternatives of 3 issue 2.
If, however, /13 or u2 were dependent only on med 01, a single conditional ideal point on issue 2 would exist. Thus, if the mean or variance of each forecast is dependent on factors other than the alternatives presently being voted on, equilibrium across issues is preserved. As stated earlier, preferences may change after one issue is decided and before the next issue is voted on. The mean or variance of the voter's forecast of future decisions may then also change, and as long as these changes are not conditioned on alternatives of the present issue, equilibrium will be preserved. Finally, we wish to stress that our model of voter forecasts is apolitical model. It may be wondered whether opportunities for learning exist that will allow voters to condition forecasts on present alternatives. Certainly, this is not impossible. However, in politics we regard this event as a special case. To say that political environments are complex is not to say that voters are illogical. Instead, the appropriate conclusion to draw is that voters must rely on what they know, or at least think they know. To build a general model based on information that voters generally do not possess does not increase our understanding of politics: in fact, it works in the opposite direction.
Conclusion
In the same way, the only part of term 2 on the left-hand side of (A4) not identical to its counterpart in the second term on the right-hand side is -2 On+I (an+l,nai 9, .--an+l,p )lp-n Finally, the only part of term 3 on the left-hand side of (A4) which does not drop out is 2 On+1 (6-in)? (a01in+i, -, ,yanwn+0) and thus (A4) can finally be rewritten as ( 
